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Over the period 2002 to 2003, Switzerland and the European Union (EU) were engaged
in negotiations regarding banking secrecy. The EU’s stated goal was for Switzerland to
abolish banking secrecy. Switzerland refused and o￿ered to impose a withholding tax on
interest income earned in Switzerland by EU residents instead. The two parties eventually
agreed on the latter solution.
In order to assess the impact of these negotiations on the pro￿tability of Swiss banks,
we analyze the response of the share price of four Swiss banks to 34 news announcements
about banking secrecy that were made over the period December 1998 to June 2003 ￿
between the decision by the EU to start exploratory discussions with Switzerland on the
taxation of savings interest and the signature of the agreement between the two parties.
The four banks considered in the study are UBS, Credit Suisse Group (CSG), Julius Baer
(Baer), and Vontobel. Only these four banks have shares that can be considered liquid.
For each bank, we investigate the share price response to individual announcements as
well as the cumulative (end-to-end) e￿ect of all announcements. Our analysis has four
main ￿ndings, one expected and three unexpected.
Our ￿rst ￿nding, which was expected, is that banking secrecy has a value to Swiss
private banks. This value is not negligible: At a minimum, banking secrecy accounts for
8.3% of the value of the equity of Julius Baer, and 12.6% of that of Vontobel.
The second ￿nding is that banking secrecy appears to have very little to no value to
the Swiss universal banks, UBS and CSG. This second ￿nding, although unexpected, is
consistent with recent statements by UBS to the e￿ect that it no longer considers banking
secrecy important for its wealth management business, having successfully developed its
private banking operations outside Switzerland.
Our third ￿nding, unexpected as well, is that in spite of the EU’s threat of imposing
sanctions against Switzerland, there appears to have been little fear that such sanctions
would actually be imposed. In contrast, there apparently was a real fear that UK sanctions
on the London-based investment banking operations of UBS and CSG would be imposed.
Our ￿nal and perhaps most surprising ￿nding, based on the cumulative impact of all
34 announcements, is that the negotiations had no overall impact on the share prices of
the four banks. This means that the withholding tax that was ￿nally agreed upon and
introduced on July 1, 2005, is not expected materially to a￿ect the pro￿tability of Swiss
banks.Negotiating over Banking Secrecy: The Case of
Switzerland and the European Union
Alexandre Ziegler¤ Fran￿ois-Xavier Delaloyey Michel Habibz
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Abstract
Over the period 2002 to 2003, Switzerland and the European Union (EU) were
engaged in negotiations regarding banking secrecy. The EU’s stated goal was for
Switzerland to abolish banking secrecy. Switzerland refused and o￿ered to impose
a withholding tax on interest income instead. The two parties eventually agreed on
the latter solution. We examine the e￿ect of these negotiations on the share prices
of four Swiss banks: UBS, Credit Suisse Group (CSG), Julius Baer (Baer), and Von-
tobel. Overall, investors believe that bank pro￿tability will not be impacted by the
imposition of the withholding tax. The event-by-event response of the share prices
di￿ers across banks. Whereas the two universal banks (UBS and CSG) primarily
react to the threat of sanctions on their EU-based operations, the private banks
(Baer and Vontobel) react strongly to events suggesting that banking secrecy might
be abolished.
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Banking secrecy was introduced in Switzerland in the 1930s with the stated aim of
protecting the privacy of bank clients. Violations are punished by ￿nes of up to 50,000
Swiss Francs and 6 months imprisonment.1 Violators are prosecuted even if no criminal
lawsuit has been ￿led by a plainti￿.
Since the passing of anti-money laundering legislation in the early 1990s, banking
secrecy can no longer be relied upon to shelter funds that originate from what would
be considered a crime or a felony under Swiss law. Banks suspicious of having received
such funds have the obligation to inform the authorities, and a criminal investigation is
launched. However, since much of what quali￿es as tax evasion in other countries is not
considered a crime or a felony under Swiss law, banks are not required to inform the
authorities of the receipt of funds suspected to originate from tax evasion. This has made
Switzerland quite attractive for such funds and appears to be a source of rents for Swiss
banks.2
In recent years, Switzerland has come under considerable pressure from other countries
to relax its banking secrecy. In particular, starting in 1998, the European Union (EU) put
pressure on Switzerland to agree to exchanging information regarding bank accounts held
by EU residents in Switzerland, i.e., abolish banking secrecy. During negotiations that
took place between June 2002 and June 2003, Switzerland was successful in preserving
banking secrecy, but agreed to introduce a withholding tax of up to 35% on interest
income earned by EU residents.3 Three fourths of the proceeds of this tax will be paid to
EU countries.
In this paper, we use an event study methodology to measure the impact of the nego-
tiations on the share prices of four Swiss banks: UBS, Credit Suisse Group (CSG), Bank
1At the time of writing, one Swiss Franc is worth about $0.77.
2According to Besson (2004, p.64), Swiss banks can a￿ord to charge higher-than-average fees by virtue
of their high-end image, their reputation for ￿nancial strength, and, last but not least, banking secrecy.
Besides fees, banking secrecy a￿ects deposits rates. English and Shahin (1994) ￿nd that, following the
passing in the late 1980s of two laws that e￿ectively removed banking secrecy for cases of insider trading
and money laundering, Swiss banks raised deposit rates by 53 and 105 basis points, respectively.
3The de￿nition of interest income for purposes of the agreement is quite broad. In addition to any
explicit interest payment, it includes accrued or capitalized interest obtained on selling ￿xed income
assets, distributions by mutual funds of income originating from interest payments, and gains on the sale
of shares in mutual funds with sizable ￿xed income investments.
1Julius Baer (Baer), and Bank Vontobel. At any point in time, the market value of a
bank can be viewed as the value of the bank in the absence of banking secrecy, plus the
value of banking secrecy to the bank weighted by the perceived probability that banking
secrecy will be preserved. A bank’s share price reacts to a given announcement to the
extent that any of these three components of bank value are a￿ected by the announce-
ment. Somewhat surprisingly, we ￿nd no overall e￿ect of the negotiations on the value
of Swiss bank shares. There are two possible interpretations to this ￿nding. The ￿rst
interpretation is that banking secrecy has no value to Swiss banks. The second is that
investors believe that the value of banking secrecy will not be impacted by the imposition
of the withholding tax. In order to distinguish between these two interpretations, we
conduct an event-by-event analysis of 34 events that occurred over the period December
1998 to June 2003, between the decision by the EU to start exploratory discussions with
Switzerland and the signature of the agreement between the two parties.
The event-by-event analysis appears to support the ￿rst interpretation for the two
universal banks, UBS and CSG. The only event that is signi￿cant for both banks is the
publication in the Financial Times of a letter by EU Commissioner Frits Bolkestein, in
which Mr. Bolkestein writes ￿I cannot stand Switzerland cheating on tax.￿ No other
event is signi￿cant for these two banks concurrently.4 We view this ￿nding as indicating
investors’ greater concern with possible sanctions on the two universal banks’ extensive
London-based investment banking operations than with banking secrecy.
In contrast, the event-by-event analysis appears to support the second interpretation
for the two private banks, Baer and Vontobel. The only two events that are signi￿cant
for both banks are the initial failure by the EU Council of Ministers to approve the treaty
agreed to the previous day by Switzerland and the EU Commission, and the ￿nal approval
of the agreement three months later. The private banks’ shares fall sharply with the ￿rst
event, and rise by an almost identical percentage with the second. We view this ￿nding
as supporting the view that banking secrecy is important to Swiss private banks, but that
the bene￿ts of banking secrecy were not put in jeopardy by the ￿nal agreement between
Switzerland and the EU. Remarkably, investors appear to have foreseen this outcome, for
none of the 32 events that precede the failure to sign the treaty is signi￿cant for the two
4We do not attempt to provide an explanation for those events that are signi￿cant for a single bank
only. Our rationale is the following. When examining the share price response of 4 banks to 34 events, we
should expect approximately 7 events to be signi￿cant at the 5% level even if there is in fact no signi￿cant
response of the share prices to the events (7 ¼ 4 £ 34 £ 0:05). We proceed on the assumption that an
event that is signi￿cant for a single bank only is a Type I error.
2private banks concurrently. This rather sanguine attitude was dealt a blow by the failure
to approve the treaty, which caused an abnormal return of ¡8:7% for Baer and ¡13:5%
for Vontobel over a three-day period, but losses were to a large extent recovered by the
abnormal returns on and around the day the treaty was ￿nally signed: +7:4% for Baer
and +14:5% for Vontobel for a three-day window.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the ￿rst paper that uses event study method-
ology to assess the importance of banking secrecy. Event studies have a long history in
economics, ￿nance, and the law. Schwert (1981) discusses the use of event studies to
measure the e￿ects of regulation. He surveys a wide variety of applications, covering the
regulation of such diverse industries as electricity, commercial and investment banking,
and pharmaceuticals. Schipper and Thompson (1983) examine the impact of merger-
related regulations adopted in the late 1960s; Ryngaert and Netter (1988) that of the
1986 Ohio Antitakeover Law. Bittlingmayer and Hazlett (2000) examine the e￿ects of
federal antitrust enforcement actions against Microsoft. Our paper is in the line of such
research. A number of papers extend the estimation from that of abnormal returns to
obtain a currency value for the e￿ects of the events considered. Cutler and Summers
(1988) and Engelmann and Cornell (1988) examine the e￿ects of litigation. Jarrell and
Peltzman (1985) and Mitchell and Maloney (1989) examine the e￿ects of product re-
calls and air crashes, respectively. Dial and Murphy (1995) and Dittmann, Maug, and
Schneider (2004) follow General Dynamics and Preussag, respectively, through extensive
restructuring and refocusing. We follow these papers in using abnormal returns to obtain
a measure of the value of banking secrecy to Swiss banks.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I summarizes the negotiations on banking
secrecy between Switzerland and the EU and lists the events considered in the study.
Section II describes the stock price data we use. Section III investigates the reaction of
bank stock prices to the individual announcements regarding banking secrecy. The results
reveal that, if considered in isolation, only a few announcements had a sizeable impact
on the market value of Swiss bank shares. Section IV investigates whether several events
taken together impacted banks’ market valuation. Section V concludes.
3I Negotiations on Banking Secrecy Between Switzer-
land and the European Union
Pressure by the EU on Switzerland to relax its banking secrecy laws increased strongly
after December 1, 1998. On that day, EU Finance Ministers agreed on a common frame-
work for the taxation of savings interest, consisting in a combination of withholding tax
and information exchange between the tax authorities of EU countries. Recognizing that
these measures might cause a sizeable out￿ow of funds away from EU countries, the min-
isters instructed the European Commission and the so-called ￿Troika￿ to start exploratory
discussions with third countries, especially Switzerland, to induce them to take similar
measures.5 An exploratory meeting between the European Union and Swiss authorities
took place on March 2, 1999. On June 9, 2000, EU Commissioner Bolkestein, in charge
of the issue for the EU, met Swiss Finance Minister Kaspar Villiger in Bern to discuss
the taxation of savings interest.
Pressure increased once again after June 20, 2000. On that day, at an EU Council held
at Feira (Portugal), EU Finance Ministers agreed to exchange information on savings in-
come with other EU countries, i.e., to report interest income earned by a citizen residing
in another member country to the tax authorities of the citizen’s country of residence.
Moreover, they decided to pressure the U.S. and key third countries (such as Switzer-
land) to agree to information exchange as well. This happened because Luxembourg and
Austria, two EU countries with strong banking secrecy laws, had made such agreement
with third countries a condition for themselves agreeing to exchange information. A few
days later, the Swiss government announced that information exchange was not a feasible
solution.
On March 16, 2001, Switzerland and the EU agreed to initiate discussions with the aim
of starting negotiations. While the EU was interested in negotiating over banking secrecy,
Switzerland wished to discuss a number of other issues, including security and migration,
education, and pensions. On June 25, 2001, the EU agreed to start negotiations with
Switzerland on banking secrecy and 9 other issues.
During the ￿rst and second rounds of negotiations on banking secrecy, which took place
on June 18 and September 3, 2002, Switzerland agreed to introduce a withholding tax, but
ruled out information exchange with EU countries. On September 7, EU Commissioner
5At any given time, the Troika consists of the current, past, and future presidents of the Council of
EU Economics and Finance Ministers (henceforth referred to as Council of Ministers).
4Bolkestein threatened Switzerland with sanctions if it did not agree to exchange informa-
tion. Possible sanctions included restrictions on capital movements between Switzerland
and EU countries and a halt to the negotiations on the 9 other issues. After EU countries
were unable to agree on sanctions on October 8, 2002, the EU and Switzerland agreed for
the ￿rst time on the principle of a withholding tax on October 31.
On January 21, 2003, the Council of Ministers agreed in principle with the proposed
solution of a withholding tax. On March 6, an agreement between Switzerland and the
European Commission on all outstanding issues was found. The agreement speci￿ed the
introduction by Switzerland of a withholding tax, initially at the rate of 15%, to be
increased to 20% and ultimately to 35%. However, on the following day, the Council
of Ministers was unable to reach an agreement on whether to approve the treaty with
Switzerland or not and postponed its decision on the issue to the next Council. Following
the approval by the Council on June 3, 2003, the agreement was signed.
This study investigates the reaction of the prices of Swiss bank shares to announcements
involving banking secrecy in the period ranging from November 1, 1998 to June 30, 2004 (a
total of 1422 trading days).6 Table I lists the 34 events in the period. The list was created
from the information posted on the Swiss Parliament’s web site; from the news released by
the Swiss Telegraphic Agency; and from the announcements made by the Administration
FØdØrale des Finances, the federal body that was in charge of the negotiations with the
EU. Events happening during weekends were recorded as occurring on the next trading
day. Such events are marked with a hash sign in Table I. For example, the results
of an opinion poll revealing that a majority of Swiss voters would be willing to relax or
abolish banking secrecy were released on Sunday, April 28, 2002. That event was therefore
recorded as occurring on Monday, April 29 (event 16 in Table I).
In addition, for each event occurring on a trading day, we analyzed the time at which
the information was released. Whenever the information about an event was released
after 4:30 p.m., market prices may not have fully adjusted by the 5 p.m. market close,
and the event was therefore recorded as taking place the following day.7 These events are
marked with an asterisk in Table I. For example, news about the outcome of the meeting
between EU Commissioner Bolkestein and Swiss Finance Minister Villiger was released
at 5:26 p.m. on May 22, 2001, and the event was therefore recorded as occurring on May
6We use November 1 as our starting date because this follows the e￿ective conclusion of the dormant
accounts litigation between Swiss banks and the World Jewish Congress.
7It turns out that none of the events in Table I occur between 4:30 and 5 p.m. Hence, all the results
would not be a￿ected if any other time between 4:30 and 5 p.m. were used as the threshold.
523. Similarly, news about the second round of negotiations was released at 7:48 p.m. on
September 3, 2002, and the event was therefore recorded as happening on September 4.
We do not attempt to classify the events in Table I as positive or negative from the point
of view of preserving banking secrecy. This is because both interpretations are possible for
most events. Consider for example event 21 on September 9, 2002, when EU Commissioner
Bolkestein threatened Switzerland with sanctions if it did not agree on a compromise
on savings interest. At ￿rst glance, this event appears to be unambiguously negative.
However, an alternative interpretation is as an act of desperation by a commissioner
otherwise unable to prevail in negotiation. This is because such sanctions were likely to
be opposed by Austria and Luxembourg, two countries that e￿ectively held veto power
over the decision to impose EU-wide sanctions. Conversely, consider event 18 on June 17,
2002, when a bill requiring that banking secrecy be written in the Swiss Constitution was
introduced in parliament. Although this event appears to be positive, it may also re￿ect
the fear on the part of the member who introduced the bill that the Swiss government
could not be relied upon to safeguard banking secrecy.
II Data and Summary Statistics
Stock price data was obtained from Datastream. Of the 18 Swiss bank stocks traded on
the Swiss stock exchange during the entire period from November 1, 1998 to June 30, 2004,
only 4 are liquid: UBS, Credit Suisse Group (CSG), Julius Baer (Baer) and Vontobel.8
UBS and CSG are universal banks active in commercial lending, brokerage, investment
banking and wealth management, whereas Baer and Vontobel are private banks with
a strong focus on wealth management. Numerous other banks of various sizes exist in
Switzerland. However, they either have retained the partnership form (such as the private
banks Pictet and Lombard Odier Darier Hentsch) or their stock is not listed on the stock
market (such as Union Bancaire PrivØe).
Summary statistics for the four bank stocks considered are presented in Table II.
Average annual returns range from about ¡9% for Vontobel, re￿ecting the failure of
its e-banking project, to almost 6% for UBS (we use continuously compounded returns
throughout the study). The annual return volatility of all four stocks exceeds 30%. As
8The fourteen other stocks are those of Bank Coop, Bank Linth, Bank Sarasin, Bank Valiant, the
New Aargau Bank, the Mortgage Bank of Lenzburg and the banks of the Cantons of Basel, Geneva,
Graub￿nden, Jura, Lucerne, Valais, Vaud and Zug. Daily turnover in these shares is a small fraction of
the turnover in the four selected stocks.
6of June 30, 2004 (the end of our sample period), the market capitalization of UBS was
about double that of CSG. Baer and Vontobel both had market capitalizations that were
smaller than those of the universal banks by an order of magnitude.
In order to investigate the impact of the negotiations on the valuation of bank stocks,
we compute the daily abnormal returns for each of the four bank stocks, as well as for
the unweighted average return across the four stocks. This average re￿ects the abnormal
return earned by an investor holding an equally weighted, daily rebalanced portfolio of
the four bank stocks. Considering an equally weighted portfolio avoids having the two
universal banks, UBS and CSG, dominate the portfolio.
We compute abnormal returns as OLS-adjusted returns, i.e., as the residuals from a
market model regression of the form9
Ri;t = ¯i;0 + ¯i;1RM;t¡1 + ¯i;2RM;t + ¯i;3RM;t+1 + ²i;t (1)
where Ri;t denotes the return on bank i, RM;t the return on the market index, and t the
day considered. Dimson (1979) found that including lead and lag terms for the market
index in the regression equation e￿ectively controls for the presence of nonsynchronous
trading, and these terms are therefore included in equation (1).
When estimating equation (1), we use the FTSE Eurotop 100 index in Swiss Francs
￿ an index of the 100 most highly capitalized blue chip companies in Europe ￿ as the
market index for two reasons. First, the bank stocks considered in our study constitute
a sizeable fraction of the Swiss Market Index (SMI). Second, given the importance of the
￿nancial sector in Switzerland, the outcome of the banking secrecy negotiations could
impact the Swiss economy at large and therefore a￿ect the returns of non-bank stocks
included in the SMI. Using an European-wide index addresses these concerns.10 Table III
reports the regression coe￿cient estimates and their t-statistics. The coe￿cients on the
contemporaneous market return range from 0.58 for Vontobel to about 1.28 for CSG and
are highly signi￿cant for all four banks, with t-statistics between 15.24 for Vontobel and
43.47 for UBS. The coe￿cients on the lagged market return are signi￿cant for UBS and
for the two small banks (and sizeable for the latter, with values exceeding 0.2), while the
coe￿cients on the leading market return are not.
9Brown and Warner (1985) show that mean-adjusted returns, market-adjusted returns (computed as
the return on the stock minus the return on the stock market index) and OLS-adjusted returns yield
similar results. Since the events considered a￿ect the four banks concurrently in our case, the movements
in the market must be adjusted for explicitly, thus the use of OLS-adjusted returns.
10In order to assess the robustness of our results, we also performed our empirical analysis using the
FTSE European Bank Index in Swiss Francs. The results (not reported) are very similar.
7Table IV reports the average, median, and standard deviation of daily abnormal returns
in percent for all days, event days, and non-event days. Days are classi￿ed as event or
non-event days using either 1-day windows or 3-day windows around the banking secrecy
announcements. In the classi￿cation based on 1-day windows, all days on which an
announcement occurs are considered event days; all others are non-event days. This
yields 34 event days and 1388 non-event days (i.e., 34 event day abnormal returns and
1385 non-event day abnormal returns).11 In the classi￿cation based on 3-day windows, all
days falling inside a 3-day window around an announcement are considered event days; all
others are non-event days. Because some events occur less than three trading days apart
(event pairs 15 and 16, 18 and 19, 22 and 23, and 32 and 33), a total of 7 trading days fall
into two overlapping 3-day windows. Accordingly, the total number of event days using
the 3-day window classi￿cation is 95, 7 fewer than the 102 event days one would have if
all event pairs were at least 3 trading days apart.
The results in Table IV reveal that the standard deviation of abnormal returns is
higher for event days than for non-event days. This is the case for all four banks as
well as for their average returns, both for the 1-day window classi￿cation and for the
3-day window classi￿cation. For the 1-day windows, the variance ratio F-statistics show
that the di￿erence in volatility between event and non-event days is signi￿cant at the 5%
level for three banks (CSG, Baer and Vontobel) and for the average return (statistically
signi￿cant test statistics are boldfaced throughout the table). For the 3-day windows,
the di￿erence in volatility is signi￿cant for two banks (CSG and Vontobel) as well as for
the average return. Thus, the data indicates that bank stocks tended to be more volatile
on and around banking secrecy announcement days than at other times, suggesting that
these announcements did have an impact on the valuation of bank stocks.
Interestingly, the mean equality tests reported in Table IV reveal that average daily
returns on event days are not statistically di￿erent from those on non-event days; neither
are median daily returns. It is worth noting that this does not imply that the value of
banking secrecy is negligible. Indeed, di￿erences in average returns between event and
non-event days do not measure the value of banking secrecy itself. Rather, they re￿ect
the cumulative impact that the negotiations had on the valuation of bank stocks. In fact,
the value of banking secrecy could be very large even if average returns did not di￿er
at all between event and non-event days. This would be the case, for instance, if the
probability that banking secrecy would survive ￿uctuated during the negotiations, but
11One day is lost in transforming prices into returns, and two returns are lost in leading and lagging
the return on the market in equation (1).
8was comparable at the beginning and at the end of the negotiations. In this case, the
return volatility on event days would be larger than that on non-event days, but there
would be no signi￿cant di￿erence between average returns on event and non-event days.
In order to assess the value of banking secrecy, a more detailed analysis than a simple
comparison of average returns is required.
III Impact of Individual Negotiation Announcements
on the Valuation of Bank Stocks
In this section, we go beyond averages and separately investigate the impact of the indi-
vidual negotiation announcements on banks’ stock prices. Section A presents our method-
ology. Section B measures the abnormal returns associated with the individual banking
secrecy announcements. Section C interprets our results.
A Methodology
In order to investigate the impact of the individual announcements on banks’ stock prices,
we estimate the regression
Ri;t = ¯i;0 + ¯i;1RM;t¡1 + ¯i;2RM;t + ¯i;3RM;t+1 +
K X
k=1
±i;kDk;t + ²i;t (2)
where Dk;t denotes a dummy variable that takes the value 1 on the k-th event day and
0 otherwise, and ±i;k its estimated coe￿cient. Since we use one dummy per day, K = 34
for 1-day windows and K = 95 for 3-day windows. Accordingly, the 1-day abnormal
return for a given event is the coe￿cient of the corresponding dummy variable, and the
3-day abnormal return is the sum of the coe￿cients of the three corresponding dummy
variables.12 In order to account for the contemporaneous correlation of the residuals,
equation (2) is estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regression.
12The 3-day windows of event pairs that occur less than 3 trading days apart (event pairs 15 and 16,
18 and 19, 22 and 23, and 32 and 33) overlap. In order to avoid double-counting, the ￿3-day￿ abnormal
returns for these events are computed as follows:
² When two events occur on trading days immediately following each other, the abnormal return for
the ￿rst window is computed as the sum of the coe￿cients of the dummy variables corresponding
to the day before the ￿rst event and the day of the event. The abnormal return for the second
window is computed as the sum of the coe￿cients of the dummy variables corresponding to the
day of the second event and the following day. Hence, both ￿3-day￿ windows contain 2 days in this
9Abnormal returns obtained in this fashion could be distorted by the presence of con-
founding events occurring on or around banking secrecy announcements. In order to
address this problem, potential confounding events for the four banks were identi￿ed
from two sources. First, we searched the database of Le Temps, a Swiss newspaper with
strong ￿nancial coverage, for all articles in which the name of any of the four banks con-
sidered in the study was included in the title. Second, we analyzed the press releases
made by the four banks, available on their web sites. We retained all announcements
that involved (1) M&A transactions (both acquisitions and divestitures), (2) changes in
top management, (3) major restructurings (such as layo￿s), (4) legal disputes or actions
taken by regulators, or (5) earnings announcements. Over our sample period, there were
50 such announcements for UBS, 60 for CSG, 15 for Baer and 14 for Vontobel. We then
identi￿ed the events that could potentially a￿ect our results as those events whose 3-
day window overlap with the 3-day window around a banking secrecy announcement (i.e.
taking place two or fewer trading days before or after a banking secrecy announcement).
There are 2 such announcements for UBS, 9 for CSG, 3 for Baer and 3 for Vontobel. Table
V reports the date and description of these confounding events, as well as the banking
secrecy announcements whose 3-day windows overlap with the 3-day window around the
confounding event.
A potential approach to account for confounding events is to estimate their impact
on stock returns and adjust the estimated abnormal returns attributed to the banking
secrecy announcements accordingly. Due to the relatively small number of events in our
sample and their large degree of heterogeneity, however, this approach would yield very
noisy estimates. Instead, we use the simpler, but more robust approach of leaving out
the days directly a￿ected by confounding events and giving a lower weight to days lying
between a confounding event and a banking secrecy announcement. Speci￿cally, when
computing abnormal returns for each banking secrecy announcement, confounding events
case.
² When two events are separated by one non-event trading day, the abnormal return for the ￿rst
window is computed as the sum of the coe￿cients of the dummy variables corresponding to the
day before the ￿rst event and the day of the event, and half the coe￿cient of the dummy variable
corresponding to the day following the event. The abnormal return for the second window is
computed as the sum of half the coe￿cient of the dummy variable corresponding to the day
preceding the second event, the coe￿cient of the dummy for the event day, and that for the day
after the event. Hence, both ￿3-day￿ windows contain 2 1=2 days in this case.
The signi￿cance tests account for the lower number of trading days in the case of these overlapping 3-day
windows.
10are taken into account as follows:
² Whenever a confounding event for a given bank occurs on the same day as a banking
secrecy announcement, no abnormal return for the banking secrecy announcement
a￿ected is computed, neither for the 1-day window nor for the 3-day window. Such
announcements are marked with an asterisk in the column ￿Events A￿ected￿ in
Table V.
² Whenever a confounding event and a banking secrecy announcement occur on trad-
ing days immediately following each other, the 1-day abnormal return is obtained
normally using the corresponding dummy variable coe￿cient. The abnormal return
for the ￿3-day￿ window is computed by leaving out the day of the confounding event.
Hence, as in the case of two banking secrecy announcements immediately following
each other, the ￿3-day￿ event window contains 2 days. Such events are marked with
a hash sign in Table V.
² Whenever a confounding event and a banking secrecy announcement are separated
by one non-event day, the 1-day abnormal return is obtained normally. The abnor-
mal return for the ￿3-day￿ window is computed by giving a weight of one half to
the day lying between the two events. Again, as in the case of two banking secrecy
announcements separated by one non-event trading day, the ￿3-day￿ event window
contains 2 1/2 days. Such events are also marked with a hash sign in Table V.
B Abnormal Returns on Announcement Dates
Table VI reports the 1-day and 3-day abnormal return on each of the four bank stocks,
as well as the average abnormal return across banks for each of the 34 banking secrecy
announcements. Cells corresponding to events for which no abnormal return is computed
for a particular bank due to a confounding event are marked with an asterisk, and ￿3-day￿
abnormal return estimates that are based on two or two and one-half dummy variable
coe￿cients only because of a confounding event are marked with a hash sign. At the 5%
level statistically signi￿cant abnormal returns are boldfaced. For individual banks, the
signi￿cance of 1-day abnormal returns is assessed using the t-statistic of the corresponding
dummy variable coe￿cient. For 3-day abnormal returns, it is based on the t-statistic for
the test that the sum of the coe￿cients of the dummy variables included in the event
window is zero.
11The average abnormal return on each day is computed as the average of the dummy
variable coe￿cients for the banks not a￿ected by a confounding event on that day. Its
signi￿cance is assessed by performing a t-test that the average of the coe￿cients of the
dummy variables included in the average is zero. This ensures that missing values do not
distort our signi￿cance tests. For example, for event 4, no abnormal return is available for
Vontobel because of a confounding event. Hence, the average 1-day abnormal return for
event 4 is computed based on the dummy variable coe￿cients for UBS, CSG and Baer,
and its signi￿cance assessed by testing whether the average of the three corresponding
dummy coe￿cients is zero. Similarly, for the 3-day window, the average abnormal return
is based on nine dummy variables ￿ three per day ￿ and its signi￿cance is assessed by
testing whether the sum of the three daily average returns is zero.
The results in Table VI reveal that abnormal returns are statistically signi￿cant for a
few events only. Overall, considering 1-day windows, there are three statistically signi￿-
cant abnormal returns for UBS, four for CSG, and ￿ve each for Baer, Vontobel, and the
average abnormal return. For 3-day windows, there are two signi￿cant abnormal returns
for UBS, three each for CSG and Baer, seven for Vontobel, and ￿ve for the average ab-
normal return. Moreover, abnormal returns on and around a given event date are only
seldom statistically signi￿cant for more than a single bank and for both the 1- and 3-day
windows.
The ninth event, the agreement between Switzerland and the EU to initiate discussions
with the aim of starting negotiations, is associated with a signi￿cant 1-day abnormal re-
turn of 4:55% for Baer, but minus 4:28% for Vontobel. Abnormal returns are not signi￿-
cant for the other banks, nor are they signi￿cant over the 3-day window. For event 10, a
meeting between Switzerland and the EU to discuss the taxation of savings interest, UBS
exhibits a signi￿cant 1-day abnormal return of 2:74%, while Vontobel displays signi￿cant
1-day and 3-day abnormal returns of 5:68% and 8:34%, respectively. Event 18 ￿ the in-
troduction of a bill in parliament requiring that banking secrecy be written in the Swiss
Constitution ￿ is associated with a single signi￿cant abnormal return, a 3-day return of
¡6:13% for Vontobel. For event 19 ￿ the ￿rst round of negotiations between Switzerland
and the EU ￿ CSG and Baer have signi￿cant 1-day abnormal returns of ¡3:48% and
¡4:20%, respectively. For event 20 ￿ the second round of negotiations ￿ Vontobel has a
signi￿cant 3-day abnormal return of ¡15:76%.13
Event 22 ￿ EU Commissioner Bolkestein writing in the Financial Times ￿I cannot
13A recommendation downgrade constitutes the most likely cause of this strong negative return. The
downgrade was issued on September 4, 2002, by the Zurich Cantonal Bank.
12stand Switzerland cheating on tax￿ ￿ is associated with large and signi￿cant abnormal
returns for both UBS and CSG. These returns are ¡5:63% over the 1-day window and
¡11:20% over the 3-day window for UBS, and ¡3:51% and ¡10:37% for CSG.14 However,
event 22 has almost no impact on the small private banks. A possible explanation for this
result is that, in contrast to the small banks, UBS and CSG would have been strongly
a￿ected by sanctions from the EU because of their strong presence in most European
￿nancial centers. We return to event 22 in Section C. Event 23 ￿ EU countries being
unable to agree on sanctions against Switzerland ￿ is associated with positive abnormal
returns for Baer (5:37% over the 1-day window and 6:05% over the 3-day window). There
are also signi￿cant abnormal returns for individual banks around events 24, 25, 26, 27
and 28, but here again, no clear pattern is apparent. Event 31 ￿ the Council of Ministers
agreeing in principle with the proposed introduction by Switzerland of a withholding tax
￿ is associated with a signi￿cant 1-day abnormal return of ¡2:77% for UBS, while event
32 ￿ Switzerland and the European Commission ￿nding an agreement on all outstanding
issues ￿ is associated with a signi￿cant positive 3-day abnormal return of 3:85% for UBS.
Events 33 and 34 recall event 22 in being signi￿cant for more than a single bank, for
both the 1- and 3-day windows. All three events constitute important exceptions to the
general pattern that abnormal returns on or around a given event date are not signi￿cant
for several banks and for both windows. Event 33 ￿ the Council of Ministers’ being
unable to decide whether to approve the proposed agreement with Switzerland or not ￿
is associated with negative abnormal returns for all four banks. Abnormal returns lie
between ¡1:64% for UBS and ¡9:38% for Vontobel on the day of the announcement, and
are signi￿cant for three of the four banks. For 3-day windows, abnormal returns range
from ¡1:28% to ¡13:52%, and are signi￿cant for two banks, Baer and Vontobel. The most
likely cause of these strong negative returns is that a rejection of the proposed agreement
by EU Finance Ministers would probably have triggered additional negotiation rounds
and prompted EU negotiators to take a much tougher stance. Accordingly, abnormal
returns for all banks are positive when the proposed agreement is ￿nally approved on
June 4 (event 34), with values between 0:47% for CSG and 7:56% for Vontobel for 1-
day windows and between 0:15% for UBS and 14:49% for Vontobel for 3-day windows.
These abnormal returns are signi￿cant for Baer and Vontobel, both on the day of the
announcement and for the corresponding 3-day window.
14The returns for CSG may be a￿ected by CSG’s announcement on October 8, 2002 of its decision
to lay o￿ 1700 employees. In accordance with the discussion in Section A, this confounding event is
accounted for by using 2 days for the ￿3-day￿ window.
13The last two rows in Table VI show the total abnormal returns over all events, as well as
their t-statistics. Total abnormal returns over all 1-day windows range from ¡15:34% for
CSG to 0:43% for Baer, and are not signi￿cant for any of the banks, nor for the average
return. For 3-day windows, abnormal returns range from ¡5:92% for CSG to 19:08%
for Baer, and are again not signi￿cant for any bank. Thus, the picture that emerges
from Table VI is that the negotiations between the European Union and Switzerland on
banking secrecy were not associated with a statistically signi￿cant decline in the market
value of Swiss bank shares.
Figure 1 shows the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the four bank stocks for
each of the 34 announcement days. The upper panel shows these abnormal returns for
1-day windows, the lower panel for 3-day windows. In each picture, the solid line depicts
the cumulative abnormal return considering all announcements, the dashed line the one
considering announcements with statistically signi￿cant abnormal returns only. Hence,
for the solid line, horizontal segments correspond to events for which no abnormal return
is computed because of a confounding event, while for the dashed line, they correspond
to events with either no or insigni￿cant abnormal returns. The pictures reveal sizeable
CARs in some cases (for example, ¡15:34% for CSG using 1-day windows). However, as
will be recalled from Table VI and because a fair amount of variation can be expected
even under the null when 34 events are considered, all CARs are statistically insigni￿cant.
Figure 1 also reveals a similarity in the pattern of CARs for UBS and CSG on the one
hand and for Baer and Vontobel on the other. This similarity is apparent for both bank
pairs for the 1-day windows, and for the pair UBS and CSG for the 3-day windows.
Table VII reports the abnormal return correlation across banks on event and on non-
event days, as well as the di￿erence between the two.15 The correlations are positive for
all bank pairs, both for 1-day windows and for 3-day windows. The top panel reveals that
correlations on event days are quite large and statistically signi￿cant for three bank pairs.
In addition to the pairs UBS/CSG (with values of 0.5657 for 1-day windows and 0.4991
for 3-day windows) and Baer/Vontobel (with values of 0.3852 and 0.2897), for which a
sizable correlation was already apparent in Figure 1, there is a strong abnormal return
correlation for the pair CSG/Baer (with values of 0.4626 and 0.3993).
Abnormal return correlations on non-event days, reported in the middle panel of Table
VII, are signi￿cant for all bank pairs thanks to the larger number of observations. As was
15For each bank pair, the correlation on event days is computed on the basis of days where neither of
the two banks considered is a￿ected by a confounding event.
14the case for event days, the correlations are largest for the pairs UBS/CSG, CSG/Baer and
Baer/Vontobel. The lower panel of Table VII reports the di￿erence between the abnormal
return correlation on event days and that on non-event days. For 1-day windows, all
correlations are sizably larger on event days than on non-event days with one exception ￿
the pair UBS/Baer ￿ with most increases amounting to about 20 percentage points. For
3-day windows, the abnormal return correlation is sizably larger on event days with two
exceptions ￿ the pairs UBS/Baer and CSG/Vontobel ￿ with most increases amounting
to about 10 percentage points. However, the Jennrich (1970) test does not reject the
null hypothesis of no change in correlation between event and non-event days. Thus,
although the point estimates are generally higher, the banking secrecy negotiations were
not associated with a statistically signi￿cant increase in the abnormal return correlation
across banks.
Figure 2 shows the cumulative average abnormal returns of the four bank stocks. The
overall impact of the negotiations on returns is small both for 1-day windows and 3-day
windows, even if only events with signi￿cant abnormal returns are considered.
C Interpretation
We now turn to the interpretation of our results. Perhaps the ￿rst conclusion to be
drawn from these results is this: banking secrecy has a value, at least to the private
banks, namely Baer and Vontobel. This is a clear implication of the decline in value that
accompanies event 33, the inability of the Council of Ministers to reach an agreement on
whether to approve the treaty with Switzerland, and the rebound in value around event
34, the approval and signing of the agreement. Thus, confronted with the possibility that
the EU may not be satis￿ed with the withholding tax proposed by Switzerland, at least
not in the form speci￿ed in the agreement, and that it may insist on the complete removal
of banking secrecy for EU residents, Baer and Vontobel su￿ered a marked decline in their
share prices. Relieved that such would not be the case after all, they saw their share
prices recover almost all the loss in value.
If banking secrecy is important, a number of questions arise. Why did UBS not su￿er
from event 33, and why did it not bene￿t from event 34, at least not to a statistically
and economically signi￿cant extent? Why were the results for CSG intermediate between
those for the private banks and those for UBS? Why did the 32 events that precede
events 33 and 34 have no clear e￿ect on the four banks, with the exception of event 22
15on UBS and CSG?16 And why did event 22, EU Commissioner Bolkestein’s writing in the
Financial Times that he ￿cannot stand Switzerland cheating on tax￿ a￿ect UBS and CSG
but not Baer and Vontobel?
The absence of reaction on the part of UBS to events 33 and 34 is consistent with
recent statements by UBS that it no longer considers banking secrecy important to the
pro￿tability of its private banking operations. UBS claims to have developed its foreign
private banking operations to such an extent that it no longer needs to rely on its Swiss
operations, those that can prevail themselves of banking secrecy, to attract and to keep
foreign clients.17 Our results are consistent with this claim. CSG may be an intermediate
case, not nearly as dependent on domestic operations and banking secrecy as the private
banks, yet not as independent of banking secrecy as UBS appears to be.18
Not only have UBS and CSG developed their foreign private banking operations, they
have also developed their foreign investment banking operations. A sizeable fraction of
the European operations are in London. We believe this explains the negative reaction of
UBS and CSG to event 22, Commissioner Bolkestein’s letter in the Financial Times. EU
sanctions on Switzerland, threatened by Commissioner Bolkestein in event 21, probably
were viewed as not feasible. This was con￿rmed by event 23, EU countries unable to
agree on sanctions, and acknowledged by Commissioner Bolkestein himself in an interview
with Swiss newspapers (event 24).19 A possible explanation for the failure to agree on
sanctions may have been Luxembourg and Austria’s opposition to such sanctions.20 In
contrast to EU sanctions on Switzerland, UK sanctions on the London-based investment
banking operations of UBS and CSG may have been viewed as being in the realm of the
feasible: UK Chancellor Gordon Brown was perceived as being one of the most determined
16By a ￿clear￿ e￿ect, we mean one that is signi￿cant for more than a single bank and for both windows.
17In the summer of 2002, UBS reported that following Italy’s tax amnesty at the beginning of that
year, almost half of the assets repatriated by Italian clients had been directed to UBS’s domestic Italian
business.
18In 2004, 36.4% of UBS’s operating income was generated outside Switzerland. The corresponding
￿gures for CSG, Baer, and Vontobel are 37.7%, 23.6%, and 12.4%, respectively. Note that these ￿gures
include income from investment banking as well as retail banking operations, because disaggregated
￿gures for private banking alone are not publicly available.
19It is also con￿rmed by the weak to non-existent reactions of UBS and CSG to event 33, the inability
of the Council of Ministers to reach an agreement on whether to approve the treaty with Switzerland.
Surely, had EU sanctions on Switzerland been considered a real possibility, investors would have feared
that the EU would resort to such sanctions for the purpose of obtaining a more satisfactory treaty.
20On October 7, 2002, Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Junker called for the EU to cease
treating Switzerland as ￿the Iraq of the Alps.￿
16opponents of Swiss banking secrecy. Such sanctions, which may have been suggested by
the publication of Commissioner Bolkestein’s letter in the Financial Times, would have
a￿ected UBS and CSG but would have been unlikely to a￿ect Baer and Vontobel, who
have little to no presence in London.21
Finally, we turn to events 1 to 32, exclusive of event 22 which we have just discussed.
Why did none of these events a￿ect the four banks considered, and the two private banks
in particular, consistently across banks and windows and in a statistically signi￿cant
sense? In our view, what our results suggest is that, until event 33 at least, investors
were remarkably sanguine about the implications of the negotiations and their perceived
outcome for the pro￿tability of the Swiss-based private banking operations of the Swiss
banks. Perhaps they felt they could rely on the convergence of interests between Switzer-
land on the one hand and EU members Austria and Luxembourg on the other to ensure
that banking secrecy, present in these two countries as well as in Switzerland, would be
preserved. Perhaps they were con￿dent that Swiss negotiators would not budge from their
o￿er of introducing a withholding tax. Regardless, it is interesting to note that our results
indicate that even a withholding tax was not viewed as compromising the pro￿tability of
private banking operations. There are a number of possible explanations for this result.
Some revolve around what has been claimed to be the relative ease of circumventing the
withholding tax, for example by setting up a trust or by reallocating the Swiss portion of
a portfolio from bonds to stocks, with o￿setting changes in the non-Swiss portion. Other
explanations would con￿rm the repeated claim made by defenders of banking secrecy to
the e￿ect that its primary purpose is to protect depositors’ ￿private sphere￿. According
to these explanations, funds are deposited in Switzerland not so much to avoid taxes as
in order to maintain depositors’ privacy.
IV Valuing Banking Secrecy
The analysis in Section III reveals that the overall (end-to-end) impact of the banking
secrecy negotiations on the market value of Swiss bank shares is not signi￿cant. As men-
21Interestingly, event 22 seems to have left other European banks una￿ected. Indeed, when we repeat
the analysis of Section B for the FTSE index of European banks in place of the four Swiss banks, the
abnormal return is insigni￿cant, both for the 1-day window and for the 3-day window. For the 3-day
window, the small, statistically insigni￿cant, negative abnormal return of 1.5% roughly corresponds to
the product of the weight of UBS and CSG in the European bank index and the abnormal returns of
these two banks around event 22.
17tioned in Section II, however, this impact does not measure the value of banking secrecy:
the value of banking secrecy could be very large even if the average abnormal return across
all event days were zero. This would be the case, for instance, if the probability that bank-
ing secrecy would survive ￿uctuated during the negotiations, but was comparable at the
beginning and at the end of the negotiations.
To see this, let V denote the value of a given bank in the absence of banking secrecy
and V s be the value of banking secrecy to the bank. For simplicity, assume that V and
V s are constant through time. Let pt denote the probability that banking secrecy will not
be abolished, as perceived by investors at time t. The probability pt can be expected to
change in line with the course of the negotiations. The value of the bank on the market
at time t, V b
t , is therefore given by
V
b
t = V + ptV
s (3)
Obviously, if pt were the same at the beginning and at the end of the negotiations, V b
t
would be the same as well, and hence average abnormal returns would be zero ￿ even
though V s might be very large.22
Events 33 and 34 provide a nice illustration of this e￿ect for the private banks. For Baer,
3-day abnormal returns are ¡8:7% for event 33 and +7.4% for event 34. For Vontobel, the
values are ¡13:5% and +14.5%, respectively. Although the sum of both abnormal returns
is clearly insigni￿cant, these results imply that banking secrecy must be worth at least
about 1 ¡ exp(¡0:087) = 8:3% of Baer’s pro￿ts and about 1 ¡ exp(¡0:135) = 12:6% of
Vontobel’s. Note that these estimates are lower bounds for two reasons. First, the change
in pt in any event window will always be less than 1 ￿ a shift of 1 would require investors
to be certain that banking secrecy would be maintained before the event, and certain
that it will be abolished afterwards, or the reverse. Such large shifts are not consistent
with the nature of the events reported in Table I. Second, these estimates are based on a
22As noted above, besides banking secrecy as such, the negotiations involved many other value-relevant
issues, such as the introduction of a withholding tax and the possibility of sanctions. Modeling these other
issues separately, by including in equation (3) additional terms for the introduction of the withholding
tax and possible sanctions, is made di￿cult by the interaction among the di￿erent issues. For example,
the probability of introducing a withholding tax (as an alternative to the abolition of secrecy) can be
expected to a￿ect not only the probability that secrecy will be maintained, pt, but also the value of
secrecy conditional on it being maintained, V s. Similarly, the possibility of sanctions a￿ects both the
probability that secrecy will be maintained, pt, and the value of Swiss banks in the absence of secrecy,
V . Equation (3) is a simpli￿cation, which takes both the value in the absence of secrecy and the value
of secrecy as given and reduces all changes in a bank’s market value to changes in the probability that
secrecy is maintained.
18single event; consecutive events in which pt shifts in the same direction could yield larger
estimates of the value of banking secrecy.
In this section, we investigate whether considering several consecutive events allows
obtaining a larger lower bound for the value of banking secrecy. The intuition is straight-
forward. The event day with the highest cumulative abnormal return (CAR) in the sample
is the day where investors were most optimistic about the outcome of the negotiations.
Similarly, the event day with the lowest CAR is the day where investors were most pes-
simistic. Hence, we can estimate a lower bound for the value of banking secrecy as the
di￿erence between the highest and the lowest CAR in the sample.
In order to assess the signi￿cance of this estimate, we compute the 5% critical values by
bootstrapping. We run the following procedure 100,000 times. From the set of abnormal
returns on non-event days, we randomly draw as many abnormal returns as there are
event days (after removing confounding events). For each such draw, we then compute
the di￿erence between the highest and the lowest CAR. The 5% critical value is the 95th
percentile of the di￿erences obtained in this fashion.
Table VIII reports the point estimates of the value of banking secrecy as well as the
5% critical values. For 1-day windows, the point estimates range from 10.92% for UBS
to 22.40% for CSG. For 3-day windows, they range from 13.70% for UBS to 32.02% for
Vontobel. However, none of the values in Table VIII are signi￿cant.
The insigni￿cance of these results could be caused by the fact that our signi￿cance test
does not account for the number of days between the maximum and the minimum CAR.
Consider for example Vontobel. As can be inferred from Figure 1, the value of 15.35%
reported in Table VIII is the di￿erence between the CAR for event 27 and that for event
33. An abnormal return of 15.35% taking place over 34 days may not be signi￿cant, but
a movement of this magnitude taking place over 6 days could be.
In order to account for the number of days between the highest and the lowest CAR
in our signi￿cance test, we re￿ne our analysis as follows. For each bank, we compute the
di￿erence between the highest and the lowest CAR under the constraint that there are no
more than N days between the two (i.e., on the basis of N abnormal returns). This can
be implemented easily by computing the di￿erence between the highest and the lowest
CAR in all possible windows of size N + 1 in the sample, and taking the largest of these
di￿erences as our value estimate. Since the CAR for the ￿rst event day is equal to the
￿rst abnormal return, it is necessary to include a ￿ctitious day 0 with a CAR of 0 in the
set of event days used to construct these windows. If one did not do so, the procedure
19would in e￿ect be ignoring the ￿rst abnormal return.
For example, assuming 34 event days, in order to obtain the di￿erence between the
maximum and the minimum CAR under the constraint that there are no more than 5 days
between the two, the procedure involves computing the di￿erence between the highest and
the lowest CAR in the window ranging from day 0 to day 5, then the one for the window
ranging from day 1 to day 6, and so on, until the one for the window ranging from day
29 to day 34. This would yield 30 CAR di￿erences. The estimate of the value of banking
secrecy based on at most ￿ve abnormal returns would be the largest of these 30 values.
Two special cases are helpful to illustrate the nature of the results obtained using this
procedure. For N = 1 (i.e., using windows of 2 days), the procedure yields the absolute
value of the largest 1-day abnormal return in the sample. For a value of N equal to the
number of event days, it yields the estimate of the value of banking secrecy reported in
Table VIII.
Critical values for these estimates are obtained by bootstrapping using the same pro-
cedure. For each of the 100,000 runs, we draw as many historical returns as there are
event days, again removing confounding events. For each value of N between 1 and the
number of event days, we then compute the largest di￿erence between the maximum and
the minimum CAR across all possible windows of size N + 1. The 5% critical value for a
given value of N is then simply the 95th percentile of these largest di￿erences for windows
of size N + 1.
Estimates of the value of banking secrecy and the critical values for each value of
N (shown on the horizontal axis) are reported in Figure 3. The solid line shows the
estimates of the value of banking secrecy under the constraint that the number of event
days between the maximum and the minimum CAR does not exceed N, the dashed line the
corresponding 5% critical values. Observe that both curves exhibit di￿erent patterns. The
estimates of the value of banking secrecy (solid lines) are uneven and reach a maximum
at a value of N corresponding to the number of days between the highest and the lowest
CAR reported in Figure 1. In contrast, the critical value curves are smoothly increasing
and concave throughout the ￿gure; the positive slope re￿ects the fact that the di￿erence
between the highest and the lowest CAR will tend to be larger, the higher the maximum
number of event days allowed between the two, while the concavity re￿ects the decreasing
returns to considering additional event days. For example, for UBS over 1-day windows,
the di￿erence between the highest and the lowest CAR reaches its maximum at N = 16
days, re￿ecting the fact that the highest CAR in Figure 1 occurs on event 16 and the
20lowest on event 33, with one confounding event in-between, event 25.
Overall, the results in Figure 3 reveal that the value of banking secrecy that can be
inferred by looking at several consecutive events is not signi￿cant, except at the very short
end, which corresponds to event 22 for UBS and CSG, event 33 for Baer, and events 33
(for the 1-day window) or 34 (for the 3-day window) for Vontobel. These will be recalled
to be the events of interest from Section C. Thus, considering consecutive event days
does not allow obtaining statistically signi￿cant estimates of the value of banking secrecy
exceeding the ones discussed at the beginning of this section. It is important to remember,
however, that these values remain lower bounds.
V Conclusion
We have analyzed the e￿ects of the negotiations between Switzerland and the EU regard-
ing banking secrecy on the share prices of four Swiss banks. Our analysis has four main
￿ndings, one expected and three unexpected. We discuss these in turn.
Our ￿rst ￿nding is that banking secrecy has a value to Swiss private banks. This value
is not negligible: At a minimum, banking secrecy accounts for 8.3% of the value of the
equity of Julius Baer, and 12.6% of that of Vontobel. In absolute terms, this amounts to
294 million Swiss Francs ($226m) for Julius Baer and 188 million Swiss Francs ($145m)
for Vontobel, at the end of our sample period on June 30, 2004.
While the ￿nding that banking secrecy has a value to private banks was expected, our
other ￿ndings were not. In particular, we did not expect banking secrecy to have little to
no value to the Swiss universal banks, UBS and CSG. Wealth management provides a very
sizeable fraction of the pro￿ts of these banks. This second ￿nding, although unexpected, is
consistent with recent statements by UBS to the e￿ect that it no longer considers banking
secrecy important for its wealth management business, having successfully developed its
on-shore (i.e., outside Switzerland) private banking operations.
Our third ￿nding is that there appears to have been little fear of EU sanctions on
Switzerland. Such an attitude may have been justi￿ed. It is nonetheless surprising and
perhaps not a little rash. In contrast, there apparently was a real fear that UK sanctions
on the London-based investment banking operations of UBS and CSG would be imposed.
Our ￿nal and perhaps most surprising ￿nding is that the negotiations had no overall
impact on the share prices of the four banks. This means that the withholding tax that
21was ￿nally agreed upon is not expected materially to a￿ect the pro￿ts of the four banks.
We are not entirely certain why that should be the case. There are various possible
explanations, ranging from the cynical (it may be easy to circumvent the tax by setting
up a trust or by rebalancing one’s portfolio) to the somewhat more edifying (defenders
of Swiss banking secrecy claim that its purpose is ￿rst and foremost the protection of
depositors’ ￿private sphere￿). Presumably, the amounts withheld under the tax, which
became e￿ective on July 1, 2005, will help determine which explanation is likely to be
valid.
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24Event Date Description
1 12/01/1998 EU Finance Ministers ask the European Commission and the Troika to start
exploratory discussions with Switzerland on the taxation of savings interest.
2 03/02/1999 Exploratory meeting between the European Commission, the Troika and the
Swiss Finance Minister to discuss the taxation of savings interest.
3 06/09/2000 EU Commissioner Bolkestein and Swiss Finance Minister Villiger meet in Bern
to discuss the taxation of savings interest.
4 06/20/2000 EU Finance Ministers agree to work towards common rules to tax savings
income. In the meantime, they agree to exchange information on savings in-
come with other EU countries. They decide to enter into discussions with the
U.S. and key third countries (such as Switzerland) to promote the adoption of
equivalent measures in those countries.
5 06/28/2000 The Swiss government announces that information exchange is not a feasible
solution.
6 09/13/2000 The Swiss government again declares to Parliament that it will not exchange
information.
7 11/27/2000 EU Finance Ministers agree on a minimum withholding tax rate of 15% for 3
years and then 20% until information exchange is implemented by a member
country.
8*# 03/12/2001 The Swiss government again declares to Parliament that it is not willing to
exchange information and abolish banking secrecy.
9 03/16/2001 Switzerland and the EU agree to initiate discussions with the aim of starting
negotiations.
10 04/11/2001 Meeting between Switzerland and the EU to discuss the taxation of savings
interest.
11* 05/23/2001 Meeting between EU Commissioner Bolkestein and Swiss Finance Minister Vil-
liger in Bern. Switzerland agrees in principle to introduce a withholding tax
on savings interest, but rules out information exchange.
12* 06/26/2001 The EU agrees to start negotiations with Switzerland on banking secrecy and
9 other issues.
13* 09/20/2001 UK Chancellor Brown challenges Switzerland to relax its banking secrecy in
order to ensure there was no hiding place for terrorist money.
14* 12/13/2001 UK Chancellor Brown declares that Switzerland should join the ￿ght against
tax evasion.
15 04/25/2002 A Swiss minister declares that banking secrecy is not negotiable but is evolving.
16# 04/29/2002 An opinion poll reveals that a majority of Swiss voters (65%) would be willing
to relax or abolish banking secrecy.
17 05/24/2002 Another opinion poll reveals that a majority of Swiss voters (58%) wants to
keep banking secrecy as is.
Table I: News Announcements about Banking Secrecy. News announcements about
banking secrecy over the period from December 1998 to June 2003. The list was created from
the information posted on the Swiss Parliament’s web site; from the news released by the Swiss
Telegraphic Agency; and from the announcements made by the Administration FØdØrale des
Finances. Events marked with a hash sign are those happening on week-ends and recorded as
occurring on the next trading day. Events marked with an asterisk are those for which information
was released after 4:30 p.m. and recorded as taking place the following day.Continued
Event Date Description
18 06/17/2002 A bill is introduced in Parliament requiring that banking secrecy be written in
the Swiss Constitution.
19 06/18/2002 First round of negotiations between Switzerland and the EU. Switzerland agrees
to introduce a withholding tax, but rules out information exchange. The EU
requests information exchange.
20* 09/04/2002 Second round of negotiations between Switzerland and the EU. Switzerland
agrees to introduce a withholding tax, but again rules out information ex-
change. The EU again requests information exchange.
21# 09/09/2002 EU Commissioner Bolkestein threatens Switzerland with sanctions if it does
not agree to a compromise on savings interest.
22 10/07/2002 EU Commissioner Bolkestein writes in the Financial Times ￿I cannot stand
Switzerland cheating on tax.￿
23 10/08/2002 EU countries are unable to agree on sanctions against Switzerland. Switzerland
once again o￿ers to introduce a withholding tax.
24 10/24/2002 EU Commissioner Bolkestein tells Swiss newspapers that sanctions are not
really feasible.
25* 11/01/2002 The EU and Switzerland agree for the ￿rst time on the principle of a withhold-
ing tax. There is still disagreement on the applicable rate.
26* 11/06/2002 EU Commissioner Bolkestein tells EU Finance ministers that Switzerland
agrees to a withholding rate of 35%, provided that the same rate is used by EU
countries electing to use a withholding tax instead of information exchange.
UK Chancellor Brown requests information exchange.
27* 11/19/2002 The ￿nance committee of the Swiss Parliament recommends writing banking
secrecy in the Constitution.
28 11/29/2002 The Swiss government declares in Parliament that the agreement with the EU
will be applicable to residents of EU countries only and will not be extended
to other countries.
29 12/12/2002 The Council of Ministers decides to postpone the decision on the taxation of
savings interest to January 21, 2003.
30 12/19/2002 The Swiss Finance Minister explains that banking secrecy is not negotiable,
even if the EU threatens with sanctions.
31* 01/22/2003 The Council of Ministers agrees in principle with the proposed solution, ac-
cording to which Switzerland would keep its banking secrecy, but introduce a
withholding tax.
32* 03/07/2003 Switzerland and the European Commission ￿nd an agreement on all outstand-
ing issues. This agreement must be approved by the Council of Ministers.
33*# 03/10/2003 The Council of Ministers is unable to reach an agreement on whether to approve
the treaty with Switzerland or not. The decision is postponed to the next
Council.
34* 06/04/2003 The Council of Ministers approves the proposed agreement with Switzerland.
The agreement is signed.
26Bank UBS CSG Baer Vontobel
Average Return (% p.a.) 5.92 ¡2:17 ¡3:10 ¡9:41
Return Standard Deviation (% p.a.) 31.64 42.18 38.84 38.23
Market Capitalization, 06/30/2004, CHF billiona 98.001 49.238 3.538 1.494
a Source: Quarterly Financial Reports of the four banks.
Table II: Summary Statistics. Summary statistics for the four bank stocks over the period
from November 1, 1998 to June 30, 2004.
27Bank UBS CSG Baer Vontobel Average
Constant 0.0004 0.0001 0.0000 ¡0:0003 0.0001
(1.1922) (0.2806) (0.0378) (¡0:4566) (0.2401)
RM;t¡1 0.0658 0.0429 0.2420 0.2029 0.1384
(2.9245) (1.3870) (7.1359) (5.3228) (6.8524)
RM;t 0.9783 1.2755 0.9237 0.5807 0.9396
(43.4686) (41.2384) (27.2494) (15.2393) (46.5317)
RM;t+1 0.0306 ¡0:0246 0.0033 0.0159 0.0063
(1.3576) (¡0:7942) (0.0978) (0.4171) (0.3120)
R2 0.5722 0.5457 0.3578 0.1545 0.6088
¾² 0.0131 0.0180 0.0198 0.0222 0.0118
Table III: Regression Results for the Four Bank Stocks and the Av-
erage Return. Results of market model regressions of the form Ri;t =
¯i;0 + ¯i;1RM;t¡1 + ¯i;2RM;t + ¯i;3RM;t+1 + ²i;t for the four bank stocks as
well as for the unweighted average return across the four stocks, re￿ecting the
return on an equally weighted, daily rebalanced portfolio of the four stocks.
Lead and lag terms of the market index return RM are included in order to
control for the presence of nonsynchronous trading. The upper part of the ta-
ble shows the coe￿cient estimates and, in parentheses, their t-statistics. The
bottom part shows the coe￿cient of determination R2 and the standard error

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Event UBS CSG Baer Vontobel Average UBS CSG Baer Vontobel Average
1 ¡1:89 ¡0:29 1.97 ¡2:52 ¡0:68 ¡1:83 ¡0:83 3.55 3.90 1.20
2 ¡0:92 ¡1:29 ¡3:09 0.99 ¡1:08 1:14 1:78 ¡1:09 3.50 1.33
3 0.55 ¡0:14 ¡0:46 0.07 0.01 3.57 1.20 ¡1:68 0.17 0.82
4 ¡0:11 ¡1:47 0.24 * ¡0:44 ¡1:11 ¡0:34 2.81 * 0.45
5 1.85 0.92 1.42 0.22 1.10 1.97 3.65 1.36 0.66 1.91
6 ¡0:16 2.38 0.37 1.14 0.93 ¡0:76 0.07 3.52 0.39 0.80
7 1.34 0.86 ¡0:46 ¡2:47 ¡0:18 1.90 0.97 ¡1:25 ¡6:14 ¡1:13
8 ¡1:19 0.39 ¡0:94 ¡0:97 ¡0:68 ¡0:71 0:42# 0.25 ¡5:66 ¡1:81
9 ¡1:37 2.15 4.55 ¡4:28 0.26 ¡3:50 1.95 5.93 0:75# 0.96
10 2.74 1.89 ¡0:58 5.68 2.43 4.16 0.90 ¡3:66 8.34 2.43
11 1.73 1.17 ¡0:81 ¡0:44 0.41 2.61 1:64# 1.05 1.32 1.81
12 ¡0:93 ¡0:91 0.14 ¡3:62 ¡1:33 ¡0:93 ¡4:08 0.36 ¡0:16 ¡1:20
13 0.49 ¡0:54 0:93 2:19 0.77 1.38 ¡2:32 3.25 ¡3:00 ¡0:17
14 0.70 0.15 ¡1:39 ¡1:29 ¡0:46 1.57 3.44 ¡0:87 ¡5:30 ¡0:29
15 ¡1:05 ¡2:10 ¡1:13 0.33 ¡0:99 ¡1:92# ¡2:77 ¡2:08 ¡1:26 ¡2:09
16 1.50 2.50 2.96 1.88 2.21 ¡0:22 1.32 1.42 0.29 0.71
17 ¡0:65 ¡0:47 0.01 1.73 0.16 ¡0:05 ¡1:48 ¡0:28 1.18 ¡0:16
18 ¡0:41 ¡2:27 * ¡2:47 ¡1:72 1.56 ¡1:23 * ¡6:13 ¡1:93
19 ¡1:32 ¡3:48 ¡4:20 1.15 ¡1:96 ¡0:56 ¡3:90# ¡1:90# ¡0:48 ¡1:60
20 ¡0:37 ¡2:54 2.39 ¡3:77 ¡1:07 ¡0:82 ¡1:66# 3.45 ¡15:76 ¡4:76
21 0.17 1.74 ¡1:38 ¡1:63 ¡0:28 ¡0:50 2.17# ¡1:17 6.77 1.93
22 ¡5:63 ¡3:51 ¡0:47 0.88 ¡2:18 ¡11:20 ¡10:37# 0.06 ¡0:43 ¡5:49
23 ¡0:45 * 5.37 3.72 2.88 3.01 * 6.05 3.82 4.30
24 0.86 2:57 2.96 4.44 2.71 2.56 ¡1:36# ¡1:00 8.53 1.98
25 * 1.07 2.11 1.58 1.58 * 5:25# 5:36# ¡0:85 1.56
26 ¡0:84 ¡8:20 ¡0:84 1.85 ¡2:01 ¡1:78 ¡4:59 ¡2:39 1.92 ¡1:71
27 0.38 ¡1:13 ¡0:31 ¡0:21 ¡0:32 ¡0:29 2.94 ¡1:25 8.00 2.35
28 0.66 2.41 ¡0:41 2.54 1.30 ¡0:35 6.27 5.27 2.70 3.47
29 0.25 0.82 1.21 ¡4:17 ¡0:47 1.71 1.81 ¡2:09 ¡5:25# ¡0:75
30 0.88 0.90 ¡3:49 1.06 0:16 0.44 ¡1:01 ¡4:28 0.21 ¡1:16
31 ¡2:77 ¡3:04 ¡0:74 ¡1:14 ¡1:92 ¡3:32 ¡0:57# 1.61 ¡2:60 ¡1:25
32 ¡0:05 ¡1:78 ¡1:64 ¡1:72 ¡1:30 3.85 ¡2:20 0.05 ¡3:23 ¡0:38
33 ¡1:64 ¡4:58 ¡7:87 ¡9:38 ¡5:87 ¡1:28 ¡4:66 ¡8:69# ¡13:52 ¡7:08
34 0.70 0.47 4.00 7.56 3.19 0.15 1.69 7.41 14.49 5.93
Total ¡6:93 ¡15:34 0.43 ¡1:07 ¡5:15 0.49 ¡5:92 19.08 ¡2:84 0.99
t-ratio ¡0:90 ¡1:47 0.04 ¡0:08 ¡0:74 0.04 ¡0:34 0:97 ¡0:14 0:08
Table VI: Abnormal Returns Around the Individual News Announcements About
Banking Secrecy. For 1-day windows, abnormal returns are given by the coe￿cient of dummy
variables that take the value 1 on the day of the event and 0 otherwise. For 3-day windows,
it is computed as the sum of the coe￿cients of three dummy variables. Events for which no
abnormal return is computed for a given bank because of a confounding event occurring on the
same day as a banking secrecy announcement are marked with an asterisk, and events for which
the abnormal return is based on fewer than 3 trading days because of a confounding event with
a hash sign. At the 5% level statistically signi￿cant abnormal returns are boldfaced.1-day 3-day
UBS CSG Baer Vontobel UBS CSG Baer Vontobel
Event Days
UBS 1 0.5657 0.1580 0.3087 1 0.4991 0.1544 0.1757
CSG 0.5657 1 0.4626 0.2677 0.4991 1 0.3993 0.1811
Baer 0.1580 0.4626 1 0.3852 0.1544 0.3993 1 0.2897
Vontobel 0.3087 0.2677 0.3852 1 0.1757 0.1811 0.2897 1
Non-Event Days
UBS 1 0.3812 0.1716 0.0977 1 0.3846 0.1722 0.0897
CSG 0.3812 1 0.2678 0.1412 0.3846 1 0.2670 0.1516
Baer 0.1716 0.2678 1 0.2086 0.1722 0.2670 1 0.2166
Vontobel 0.0977 0.1412 0.2086 1 0.0897 0.1516 0.2166 1
Di￿erence
UBS 0 0.1845 ¡0:0136 0.2110 0 0.1144 ¡0:0177 0.0859
CSG 0.1845 0 0.1948 0.1265 0.1144 0 0.1323 0.0296
Baer ¡0:0136 0.1948 0 0.1767 ¡0:0177 0.1323 0 0.0731
Vontobel 0.2110 0.1265 0.1767 0 0.0859 0.0296 0.0731 0
Table VII: Correlation Between Banks’ Abnormal Returns on Event and Non-Event
Days, and Di￿erence Between the Two. For each bank pair, the correlation on event
days is computed on the basis of days where neither of the two banks considered is a￿ected
by a confounding event. At the 5% level statistically signi￿cant values are boldfaced. The
signi￿cance of each correlation is assessed using the standard t-test, that of the di￿erence in
correlation between event and non-event days using the Jennrich (1970) test.
321-day 3-day
UBS CSG Baer Vontobel UBS CSG Baer Vontobel
CAR Di￿erence 10.92 22.40 14.09 15.35 13.70 22.24 25.07 32.02
5% Critical Value 17.46 23.82 26.05 29.31 29.69 38.93 44.43 46.92
Table VIII: Estimates of the Value of Banking Secrecy and 5% Critical Values. The
point estimates are based on the di￿erence between the maximum and the minimum cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) reported in Figure 1 across all event days. The 5% critical values are
computed by bootstrapping, i.e., as the 95th percentile of the di￿erence between the highest and
lowest CARs obtained from random draws from the set of abnormal returns on non-event days.
33(a) 1-day windows








































































Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of the Four Bank Stocks. Cumu-
lative abnormal returns of the four bank stocks for each announcement using 1-day
windows (top panel) and 3-day windows (bottom panel). Solid lines depict the CARs
considering all announcements, dashed lines CARs considering announcements with
statistically signi￿cant abnormal returns only.















Figure 2: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns. Cumulative average abnor-
mal returns of the four bank stocks for each announcement using 1-day windows (top
panel) and 3-day windows (bottom panel). Solid lines depict the CARs considering
all announcements, dashed lines CARs considering announcements with statistically
signi￿cant abnormal returns only.
35(a) 1-day windows





































































Figure 3: Estimates of the Value of Banking Secrecy and 5% Critical
Values. Estimates of the value of banking secrecy based on the di￿erence between
the maximum and minimum cumulative abnormal returns under the constraint that
there are no more than N days (reported on the horizontal axis) between the two
(solid line), and the bootstrap 5% critical values (dashed line). The top panel reports
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